Coffer ETH Bonds and Marketplace
Security audit and mitigation review of Coffer's Ethereum validator-backed ETH bond contracts and signed-order marketplace. The report dated 22 October 2026 records 11 findings: two Medium, five Low and four Informational, with seven fixed and four acknowledged residual risks. No Critical or High finding was identified in the reviewed scope.
Scope
10 files · 1,178 SLOCFindings
see the full report for individual write-upsFinal report
The security audit and mitigation-review report is dated 22 October 2026 and is available as a 40-page PDF. It records the scope, individual finding write-ups, verification evidence and final dispositions. The review ran from 12 to 22 October 2026.
This public copy matches the corrected PDF delivered to the client. SHA-256: c2f84b1db4aa2963385fbfc5f8846dbcb93a87aaefede32f16a802f7efd7e789.
Remediation outcomes
The audit identified 11 findings: two Medium, five Low and four Informational. No Critical or High finding was identified in the reviewed scope. The mitigation review records seven fixed findings and four acknowledged residual risks.
The fixed findings include the marketplace cancellation-nonce issue and corrections to redemption-funding guidance, consensus-withdrawal timing, credential-binding guidance, deployment ownership and withdrawal-event documentation. A documentation correction is not presented as removal of the underlying runtime behavior.
The four acknowledged findings preserve these qualifications:
- M-02: A partial default claim changes a bond's remaining value without changing its ERC-721 token ID. External venues must validate remaining value atomically with transfer; stale external listings remain an accepted integration risk.
- L-01: The
uint32purchase timestamp retains a February 2106 rollover boundary. Documentation and stopping sales before that boundary address the operational response; the stored type is unchanged. - L-02: The public third-party default-declaration path remains exposed to transaction ordering. The holder's atomic redeem-or-default path and private ordering are the documented alternatives.
- L-05: Primary purchases use the fee, bond terms and owner at transaction execution. Documentation explains this accepted risk; calldata still does not bind a deadline, maximum fee, minimum maturity value or expected owner.
Reviewed scope and revisions
The initial scope comprised ten Solidity and deployment-script files, totalling 1,178 nSLOC, frozen at core commit 793f6a78d805bfa2c83320633dc5984eca1038db and marketplace commit 926218175f6534b7d867ea30193fafae6cbf346a.
The report separately identifies the remediation commits and evidence used for each final disposition. The initial scope hashes above are not a claim that every later revision, application component or deployment was audited.
Assessment limitations
The report describes a fixed-duration review. It is not exhaustive, does not guarantee the absence of vulnerabilities and does not eliminate the four acknowledged residual risks. The findings and remediation conclusions apply to the documented scope, revisions and evidence. They do not certify the whole platform, later code changes or future operational security.
Team & approval
Disclaimer
This audit is not an endorsement and does not constitute investment advice. Zealynx reviewed the codebase at the commits listed in section 02 over the engagement window. Findings are limited to issues identified within that scope and do not preclude the existence of other vulnerabilities. Subsequent code changes are not covered by this report unless the engagement is explicitly extended.