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Plakxio · Smart Contract Security AssessmentPlakxio Client Hub

Plakxio Badge Marketplace: Full Audit and Mitigation Review

Final consolidated audit and mitigation review of Plakxio's badge marketplace contracts and deployment scripts on Base. The 21 October 2026 report covers frozen generation-d: 24 findings, with 20 fixed without the named residuals, two fixed with bounded residuals, one partly addressed with exposure retained by design, and one addressed through agreed documentation. The full report records the scope, verification history and limitations.

BaseSoliditySmart Contract Code Review2026-09-18Zealynx methodology
Total findings
24
20 fixed · 2 fixed with residuals · 1 partly addressed · 1 addressed through documentation
Critical
00
High
00
Medium
12
Low + Info
12
02

Scope

14 files
Initial commit
d8fa452dc423
Final commit
bcf18bb29265
Platform
Base · Solidity
Methodology
Out of scope
Future Base mainnet deployment and production configuration, Off-chain application, relayer, monitoring and key custody, Later code changes
File
src/PlakxioBadge.sol
src/PlakxioSettlement.sol
src/PlakxioSpecialMarket.sol
src/QuoteTreasuryManaged.sol
src/PlakxioOrderTypes.sol
src/IERC3009.sol
src/IBlacklistable.sol
script/network.sh
script/DeployBase.s.sol
script/AdminHandover.sol
script/deploy_base.sh
script/upgrade_market.sh
script/retire_superseded.sh
script/post_retire_check.sh
03

Findings

click any row for the full write-up
Severity
ID
Finding
Status
mediumM-01Special holders can pre-bank an opt-out while the market is unlisted or revoked and escape the ascending auctionFixed›mediumM-02At feeBps == FEE_BPS_CEILING, opposite rounding makes 19 of every 20 prices unsettleableFixed›mediumM-03Upgrade scripts leave DEFAULT_ADMIN on the broadcast keyFixed›mediumM-04Retiring the old market before its replacement activates halts tradingFixed›mediumM-05Upgrade scripts can register markets with an invalid quote tokenFixed›mediumM-06Retirement can leave historical market authority activeFixed›mediumM-07Deployment artifacts are not bound to the configured RPC chainFixed›mediumM-08Concurrent deployments can promote another run's unverified artifactFixed›mediumM-09Base deployment silently retains DEFAULT_ADMIN when ADMIN_ADDRESS is unsetFixed›mediumM-10Retirement can deauthorize the replacement while preserving the superseded marketFixed›mediumM-11The Special floor registry enforces no monotonicity, so a whitelisted Special-class operator can write the floor downwardFixed · residual›mediumM-12A holder has no on-chain way to refuse an operator for their Special badges, and the delay that replaces it is floored at 60 secondsPartly addressed›lowL-01Gasless makers cannot invalidate unenumerated ordersFixed · residual›lowL-02A narrowed class mask is misreported as a buyer rejectionFixed›lowL-03The gas model documents transaction paths the contracts do not haveFixed›lowL-04purchaseBlocked can miss a blocked treasury when a badge uses stored commissionFixed›lowL-05Gasless holders cannot submit the operator opt-out required by the trust modelFixed›lowL-06Setting a market as its own treasury permanently traps revenueFixed›lowL-07Retirement reports success before permission changes are durable on BaseFixed›lowL-08Readiness views omit a blacklisted market from mandatory payment partiesFixed›lowL-09The holder's refusal reports success for Special badges it does not bindFixed›lowL-10purchaseBlocked changed signature with no overload, breaking off-chain callers silentlyAddressed · docs›lowL-11Nothing enforces the 72-hour activation delay at a production deploy: an env default, a 60s floor, and a self-skipping assertionFixed›infoI-01StressLive reports success when every settlement item failsFixed›
04

Final report

The final consolidated audit and mitigation-review report is dated 21 October 2026 and is available as a 93-page PDF. It closes this engagement's remediation cycle for the documented scope and frozen revision. The PDF contains the individual finding write-ups, evidence, final dispositions and limitations.

This public copy is the same PDF delivered to the client. SHA-256: 63335d36f0ce89c11e57a4c7df0149426a124b7cfbee56d95329d3560e81d7eb.

05

Remediation outcomes

The report accounts for 24 findings: 19 from the September full audit and five from the October mitigation re-review. Their severities are 12 Medium, 11 Low and one Informational; none was rated Critical or High. The earlier Founder Security Sprint is a separate engagement and is not added to these totals.

  • 20 findings fixed without the named residuals below.
  • Two fixed with bounded residuals: L-01 retains a bounded maker nonce exposure; M-11 retains a privileged first-write limitation from zero. These are included in the headline total of 22 fixed findings, with their qualifications preserved in the individual write-ups and PDF.
  • One partly addressed, with exposure retained by design: M-12, concerning Special-badge holder protections and administrator trust. Its exact disposition is Partly addressed.
  • One addressed through the agreed documentation route: L-10, concerning interface changes. It is shown as Addressed · docs, rather than being presented as a code fix.

No additional blocking defect was identified in the reviewed scope. These conclusions do not mean every risk was eliminated; the retained exposures and evidence limits remain part of the final report.

06

Reviewed revision and scope

The final mitigation review is bound to generation-d, commit bcf18bb2926589bb8538fa8c322eabc871ff2801. The initial full-audit baseline was d8fa452dc423d00760d3159f290d82b7cc5e1857.

The latest pass assessed seven full-audit/re-review findings and the sprint carryover at generation-d, together with the generation's access-control and retirement changes. Seventeen earlier remediation dispositions are carried from the prior re-review at f020448976eb7c4895e1626ef3228876cff2b7d2, as attributed in Appendix B. This was not a fresh re-audit of the whole tree. The file list above describes the final mitigation-review scope, restricted to those remediations and changes.

07

Deployment and verification limitations

Deploying to Base mainnet was not required during the audit. Smart-contract code can be reviewed before deployment. The report's mainnet limitation means that the eventual production deployment, configuration, permissions and operations were not independently verified by this engagement; it does not impose a mainnet-deployment prerequisite for the final report.

Two extended retirement harnesses did not complete and are not counted as passes. The affected retirement dispositions rest on the cited code inspection. The agreed 72-hour production-delay rehearsal remains post-review evidence, not a condition for issuance of this report. The PDF identifies client assertions that were not independently verified and records the complete evidence boundaries.

The accurate attribution is Smart contracts audited by Zealynx, linked to this report and its reviewed revision. The assessment is not a blanket approval or security certification for the platform, a future deployment or later code changes.

08

Team & approval

Lead Auditor
Carlos (Bloqarl)
@TheBlockChainer
09

Disclaimer

This audit is not an endorsement and does not constitute investment advice. Zealynx reviewed the codebase at the commits listed in section 02 over the engagement window. Findings are limited to issues identified within that scope and do not preclude the existence of other vulnerabilities. Subsequent code changes are not covered by this report unless the engagement is explicitly extended.

Download PDF (93p)
ZEALYNX SECURITY · published 2026-09-18
24 findings · Solidity