`block.timestamp` use in dex swap deadlines may cause poor trading

Impact: Medium

Likelihood: Medium

In the PositionInteractionFacet.sol contract, when executing DEX swaps, the deadline parameter is set to block.timestamp + 30 minutes:

IV3SwapRouter.ExactOutputSingleParams memory params = IV3SwapRouter.ExactOutputSingleParams({
    tokenIn: assetIn,
    tokenOut: assetOut,
    fee: dex.dexFee,
    recipient: address(this),
    deadline: block.timestamp + 30 minutes,  // Unnecessary buffer
    amountOut: amountOut,
    amountInMaximum: amountInMaximum,
    sqrtPriceLimitX96: sqrtPriceLimitX96
});

This implementation is problematic for several reasons:

1. The 30-minute buffer is unnecessary since the transaction will be executed at the current block.timestamp anyway.
2. This extended deadline window allows malicious MEV bots to potentially withhold the transaction and execute it at a less optimal time.
3. This implementation doesn't provide any real protection against transaction delays since the actual execution time is determined by the network's block production.

Replace the current deadline implementation with the user input deadline.

Published by Pashov Audit Group, with Carlos (Bloqarl) participating as a contractor. The source report states that its fixes review was not fully completed; no final remediation disposition is recorded for this finding. Read the full report.