Overly Permissive CORS Policy
CORS policy reflected all origins with credentials enabled, enabling cross-site request forgery and data exfiltration for cookie-authenticated endpoints. Primary auth uses Authorization headers so practical impact was limited.
Description
// bootstrap.utils.ts L134-L140function initCors(app: NestExpressApplication): void {app.enableCors({origin: true, // reflects ALL originsmethods: "GET,HEAD,PUT,PATCH,POST,DELETE,OPTIONS",credentials: true, // allows cookies cross-origin});}
Frontend / on-chain mitigation analysis: CORS is a server-side policy, no frontend or on-chain control can mitigate this. The primary customer API authentication uses Authorization headers (not automatically attached cross-origin by browsers), reducing practical CSRF risk.
Impact
Cross-site request forgery and data exfiltration for cookie-authenticated endpoints. Practical impact is currently limited because the primary auth uses Authorization headers.
Recommendation
Replace origin: true with an explicit allowlist of trusted origins.
Resolution
Fixed by infrastructure deletion in PR #3706, the dead session stack (express-session, cookie-parser, connect-redis) was removed entirely and CORS is now { origin: true, credentials: false }.

