Unbounded array input in batch functions allows potential DoS attacks and gas griefing

The stakingPoolOfBatch function and other similar batch functions in the GenesisLicense contract accept arrays of arbitrary length without imposing any limits:

function stakingPoolOfBatch(uint256[] memory tokenIds_) external view returns (address[] memory stakingPools_) {
    GenesisLicenseStorage storage $ = _getGenesisLicenseStorage();
    stakingPools_ = new address[](tokenIds_.length); // Initialize array for staking pools

    // Get staking pool for each token ID in the array
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < tokenIds_.length; ++i) {
        stakingPools_[i] = $._stakingPools[tokenIds_[i]]; // Store staking pool address
    }
}

This pattern creates two potential issues:

1. DoS Risk: If called with an extremely large array, the function could exceed the block gas limit, making it impossible to execute.
2. Gas Griefing: When these functions are called internally by other contract functions, an attacker could pass a large array to consume excessive gas, potentially causing legitimate transactions to fail.

While this is a view function and doesn't directly impact state, similar patterns in non-view functions could be more problematic, and even view functions can be called by other contracts.

Add reasonable maximum length limits to array parameters:

function stakingPoolOfBatch(uint256[] memory tokenIds_) external view returns (address[] memory stakingPools_) {
    require(tokenIds_.length <= 100, "Batch size exceeds limit");
    // Rest of function unchanged
}